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July 2008

EXPAND THE U.S. MILITARY? NOT SO FAST
Dr. Steven Metz
Strategic Studies Institute
Today there is bipartisan support for increasing the size of the U.S. military,
particularly the land forces. While conservatives like Frederick Kagan and
Thomas Donnelly have provided the most detailed rationale, even liberals like
Barack Obama agree. At first glance, this seems like a common sense step to
alleviate the stress on the military and prepare for future security challenges. But
is it? When the rationale for expansion is carefully dissected, its desirability is
not so clear.
Expanding American ground forces is necessary if one or both of two things
are true. The first is whether the United States will need to sustain a major
military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan for an extended period of time. If so,
we need a larger Army and Marine Corps to increase the interval between
deployments, thus protecting the quality of life for service members and
providing time for training and professional development. Certainly Iraq and
Afghanistan badly stress the Army and the Marine Corps. This must be
addressed before American land forces sustain irreparable damage. But
enlarging the ground forces may not be the best way to do this. It will be years
before an expanded force produces more noncommissioned, company, and field
grade officers—the groups most affected by the current pace of deployment.
New units will need leaders, thus increasing the demand for noncommissioned,
company, and field grade officers even more.
In the broader sense, if Iraq and Afghanistan still need a large scale American
troop presence after the 5 years or so expansion would take, then the United
States should reconsider its commitment to those nations, perhaps removing
them from the life support provided by the U.S. military. If they cannot stand
with only modest help by then, they may never. Had the expansion begun
several years ago, the military might not be as stressed as it is today. But
beginning it now is simply addressing last year’s problem with next year’s
money.
Expanding the military also makes sense if its mission is to undertake future

operations like Iraq and Afghanistan—large scale, protracted counterinsurgency
support and stabilization activities. This is the main rationale for expansion. But
should it be? A powerful case can be made that outside the Western
Hemisphere, the strategic and economic costs of U.S. involvement in large scale,
protracted counterinsurgency or stabilization outweigh the benefits. Supporters
of expansion often contend that the United States must undertake
counterinsurgency or stabilization because “ungoverned spaces” provide a
breeding ground or haven for transnational terrorists. This is an unsubstantiated
assumption. Al-Qaeda did not operate in Afghanistan because that nation was
ungoverned. Al-Qaeda has training facilities in Pakistan because the Islamabad
government elects to leave them alone. Even if the U.S. Army and Marine Corps
were double their current size, this would not change. We certainly face a
strategic problem in Pakistan, but expanding the U.S. military is not the cure.
Even if an insurgent movement won, it would be more effective to prevent it
from providing a haven to al-Qaeda after it seized power than to try and prevent
it from seizing power in the first place. We can coerce or remove regimes which
support terrorism. We are good at it. We are not so good at the much more
complex, dangerous, and expensive task of re-engineering beleaguered partners,
particularly if we must do it in several places at once. Yet if we have a larger
ground force, we will feel compelled to use it, undertaking costly commitments.
Better to resist in the first place than to stumble into massive burdens for limited
strategic gains.
For what we might spend on more ground forces, we could create a
deployable law enforcement support organization, enlarge key components of
the intelligence community, and improve our foreign assistance programs, thus
seeking to prevent conflicts rather than put a lid on them once they explode. Or,
we could strike at the heart of our security dilemmas and invest more in ending
our petroleum addiction, reviving our national scientific and technological
prowess, or other steps to bolster our economic competitiveness. Expanding the
military makes sense if we intend to remain the world’s policeman. Doing so
may not best promote the national interest.
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